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Firms, do you know your currency risk exposure? Survey results
This paper surveys the currency risk management practices of Swiss industrial corporations. Many of them sell most of their output abroad and would therefore seem to be heavily exposed to currency risk.
In fact, currency risk can be substantial. Between 1978 and Swiss franc experienced dramatic swings in relation to major currencies such as the U.S. dollar, the Italian lira, and the British pound. Comparing highest and lowest exchange-rate levels, the U.S. dollar depreciated by 60% vis-à-vis the Swiss franc, the Italian lira by 70%, and the British pound by 62%. Moreover, although not as high as those observed in the equity markets, annual currency rate volatilities can be sizable-in the past six years or so, the volatility of the U.S. dollar, for example, has exceeded 12%. The purpose of this study is to examine whether industrials quantify their risk profile.
Risk management can benefit shareholders because of various concavities in the risk profile of firm value [Stulz (1984) , Smith and Stulz (1985) , Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) , ]. Such a risk profile (RP) maps firm value against unexpected changes in a specific output price or factor cost. RP concavities are brought about by, among other things, direct costs of financial default, transaction costs of outside funding, asymmetries of information between managers and investors, moral hazard, "firm-specific investments" of noninvestor groups such as managers, employees, customers, and suppliers, and convex tax schedules.
Accordingly, unfavorable states of the world reduce firm value by more than favorable states of the world raise it. Reducing risk can therefore raise firm value.
Risk management can in principle also benefit large, underdiversified shareholders by reducing their individual risk exposure. Tufano (1996) details the corporate risk management activities in the North American gold mining industry. According to the data, firms whose managers hold more stock manage more gold price risk, consistent with the claim that managerial risk aversion affects corporate risk management policy. Risk management can also benefit managers by enabling them to demonstrate their superior abilities in a world in which their performance depends on uncontrollable risks, such as interest or currency risks. In this case, hedging enables managers to "lock in" their superior abilities [Breeden and Viswanathan (1996) ].
Most of the literature focuses on firm-value maximization as the ultimate reason for managing risk. Under that assumption, adopting the appropriate risk-protection policy would seem to require knowing the (asymmetric) RP of firm value [see, for instance, Adler and Dumas (1984) , Smith (1995) , or Stulz (1996) ]. The protection policy itself typically boils down to a portfolio of derivative securities because of the low costs of those products. 1 In fact, knowing the currency RP of firm value is not always necessary [see also Smith (1995) ]. Depending on the purpose of currency risk management, it can be simpler for managers to focus on other risk profiles. For instance, to reduce expected taxes in the presence of convex tax schedules, all they need to know is the currency risk profile of taxable income, which maps taxable income against unexpected changes in currency rates. Similarly, to avoid the deadweight costs of external finance, it might be simpler to focus on the RP of the firm's cash flow [Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994) , Tufano (1998a) ]. We therefore focus on knowledge of the RP of firm value, but inquire also about knowledge of other risk profiles, including that of operating cash flow.
1 This conceptual approach to currency risk management (namely the measurement of the currency RP of firm value and its hedging/insurance with derivative securities) is fairly diffuse and has found its way into the financial management courses of graduate schools. See, for instance, the case study Jaguar plc, 1984 (Harvard Business School, 9-290-005 ) and the associated teaching note (Harvard Business School, 5-290-034).
Our survey shows that, although they claim to manage risk, industrial companies do not know the currency RP of their value. More than half of them do not even know the currency RP of their cash flow.
And those that do know have only a rough idea and focus on a horizon of about 12 months. We examine possible reasons, including that industrials do not hedge, that they have reason to believe their exposure is trivial, and that they fail to understand the importance of assessing their risk profiles.
None of these rationales matters. There is also no evidence that managers ignore the currency RP of firm value because they focus on the RP of other variables instead.
As it turns out, Swiss industrials manage long-run exposure with tools such as contractual clauses, money-market hedges, and operating adjustments. We call these tools on-balance-sheet protection instruments to distinguish them from currency derivatives, which are typically reported off the balance sheet. 2 The availability of these instruments may explain why industrials don't know the currency RP of their cash flow, let alone that of their value. They may simply think they do not need to know. Their approach in managing long-run exposure may consist of two phases. First, firms may choose a contractual, financial, and operating setup to limit whatever currency exposure they have. For example, they may diversify away currency risk by establishing plants or sourcing in different currency areas. Or they may have their foreign subsidiaries borrow in local currencies. After these precautionary measures are in place, companies may simply wait and see. When currency rates change, they may assess the seriousness of the impact, and then react, if necessary, with the appropriate contractual, financial, and operating adjustments. This is the second phase of industrials' currency risk management. A Swiss exporter to the U.S., for instance, may wait for the dollar to depreciate in relation to the Swiss franc, assess the consequences of that depreciation, and, if necessary, take the appropriate measures.
That could include raising dollar prices, redesigning products to cater to a more price-inelastic clientele, moving production from Switzerland to the U.S., or tying the wages of employees to the dollar. 3 Firms also hedge/insure individual short-term transactions with currency derivatives.
But in doing so they do not appear to rely on an aggregate measure of their transaction exposure.
Overall, the hedging approach we infer from the data is puzzling.
Taking into account the RP of firm value (or at least that of cash flow or of transaction exposure) could help firms better calibrate their on-balancesheet hedges and take advantage of currency derivatives.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. Section one clarifies the terminology. Section two discusses the structure of the questionnaire used in the survey. Section three describes the sample of firms surveyed and provides information about response rates and associated descriptive statistics. Section four documents the finding that industrial firms do not know the currency RP of cash flow or the currency RP of firm value. Section five discusses possible reasons. Section six documents the on-balance-sheet hedging activities and provides an explanation of why, under this hedging approach, industrials do not quantify their currency risk exposure. Section seven debates the findings' applicability to other countries. Section eight examines whether the information obtained in our survey can be considered accurate, and section eight draws conclusions.
Terminology
There are many ways in which firms can protect against foreign exchange risk. Bodie and Merton (2000) list four broad possibilities. We use their taxonomy. First, firms can simply avoid risk. That would seem to involve choosing to sell or buy in markets that are not exposed to currency risk.
In an open economy, this is almost impossible to achieve since even if firms are able to avoid direct exposure, at least some of their suppliers, customers, or competitors will bear some exposure. Second, firms can reduce the likelihood or the severity of losses. A Swiss company that exports to France can finance some of its operations with French francs or buy materials from French suppliers.
Third, firms can transfer risk to others. There are basically three ways they can do this:
Ø They can hedge. That means, they can sell potential gains from favorable currency changes to cover losses from unfavorable changes.
A Swiss importer, for instance, can enter into a forward contract to buy Italian lire to fund its purchases from its Italian supplier;
Ø They can insure. This involves paying another party to assume their currency risk. For example, some firms insure with currency options whereas others do so by invoicing in Swiss francs rather than in foreign currencies;
Ø They can diversify. An importer can source from suppliers in different countries rather than from only one supplier. This diversification spreads risk over different, possibly uncorrelated currencies. The suppliers assume some of the importer's risk since the importer will buy from the suppliers with the more favorable currency rates.
The final approach to risk protection in the Bodie and Merton (2000) classification is risk bearing. Firms can simply decide that the risk they are exposed to is too small to worry about.
Survey characteristics
The questionnaire consists of 44 questions grouped in 9 sections.
No question is open-ended, meaning that firms are asked to check from a fixed set of possible answers the one (or the ones) they agree with (they are always given the option, however, of formulating their own answer if the ones we offer do not apply). Table 3 . Not even 40% of the sample firms are able to quantify their exposure: 37% can do so for the U.S. dollar, 38% for the German mark, 30% for the Italian lira, and 28% for the French franc. These low percentages may be misleading, since not all firms have a significant exposure to all four currencies. Perhaps the firms that know their exposure to, say, the dollar are not concurrently exposed to any of the other three currencies. We therefore compute the number of firms able to quantify their exposure to at least one of the four currencies, but our conclusion does not change much. Only 43% of the sample firms can do so. 4 We refer to our sample firms interchangeably as nonfinancials and industrials.
5 Annual ten-percent changes in currency rates are not unusual. As mentioned above, the annualized volatility of the U.S. dollar during the interval 1990-1997 has exceeded 12%. Consistent with the finding that firms do not know the RP of operating cash flow, the proportion of firms that actually protect "likely future foreign currency inflows and outflows, including those that have not been contractually stipulated yet" is only 33%.
It could be that exposure is not significant enough to warrant explicit quantification. We therefore focus on firms that claim to have protected against currency risk in any one of the years 1993, 1994, or 1995. These firms should have reasons to know their exposure. Table 4 below finds out by sorting firms into four groups, depending on whether they protect against currency risk and on their ability to quantify exposure. We can take the analysis one step further and examine how many firms with a reason to protect against currency risk know the currency RP in question. Together, these findings suggest that fewer than 50% of the firms, even of those that claim to protect against currency risk, are able to (roughly) quantify the RP of their operating cash flow. The remainder either do not want to tell, fail to understand the question, or really do not know. We believe it is the latter.
To find out, we separately ask respondents to list the questions they skipped for fear of revealing confidential information. Few questions are listed and, among those that are, the one concerning currency exposure is mentioned in only 5% of the cases. Thus companies do not avoid mentioning their currency risk exposure because they are reluctant to reveal sensitive information.
We also find little reason to believe that the exposure question is hard to understand because, when asked to list the questions that are unclear, only 12% of the firms include this particular question. Table 6 . In sum, since it is not a matter of reluctance to answer or failure to understand, it must be thats firms simply do not know the currency risk exposure of their cash flow.
Quantifying the RP of firm value
Since most firms do not know the RP of cash flow, they cannot know the currency RP of firm value either. The reason is that projected cash flows and their sensitivity to unexpected currency changes would appear to be crucial building blocks in the assessment of the RP of firm value. 6
6 The RP of firm value can be approximated with the covariance between stock returns and changes in forex rates. But, at best, that covariance measures the firm's residual RP, i.e., that which remains after taking into consideration the firm's hedging policy. The problem is that managers would like to know the firm's currency risk exposure before the hedging policy.
That conclusion is substantiated by three additional observations. investors. This is inconsistent with a concern for firm value. All this could occur because, as Smith (1995) points out, it is difficult for firms to credibly precommit to risk management. But some firms do disclose their risk management activities. In fact, more than 75% of the listed firms inform at least one of the investor groups in question (not shown). Thus, most listed firms must have found a way to precommit, possibly by building up a reputation for truthful disclosure.
The table further suggests that firms neglect to provide risk management information to suppliers, customers, and creditors. Only one firm in the listed sample and no firm in the unlisted sample makes a point of disclosing such information to all three of these business partner groups (not shown). Again, this behavior is difficult to understand if the risk management rationale is to maximize firm value. Presumably, suppliers are more willing to do business with a firm able to control its currency risk, and customers value such a firm's explicit and implicit guarantees more highly.
Interpretation
There are various possible reasons why industrials do not compute their currency RP of firm value (or of their cash flow). Among other things, they might: (1) not protect against currency risk to begin with and speculate instead; (2) fail to understand the relevance of measuring their currency exposure; (3) have reason to believe their currency risk exposure is trivial; (4) believe that unexpected currency rate changes are offsetting;
(5) want to reduce the exposure of variables other than firm value; (6) be unable to measure their risk exposure with the necessary accuracy; or (7) be reluctant to enter large derivatives positions.
Industrials may not want to protect against currency risk
If firms speculate rather than protect against currency risk, there is no reason why they should know the currency risk profile of their value. 7
To examine this possibility, one first has to decide where protection stops and speculation begins. Since it is unclear whether currency risk management based on views corresponds to speculating, we use a somewhat stricter definition of speculation. We ask firms whether they engage in transactions in foreigncurrency-denominated or currency-derivative securities independently of the operating business to take advantage of predicted changes in currency rates. We are careful not to mention the word speculation because of its negative connotation. In contradiction to the speculation hypothesis,
7 On the issue of hedging versus speculating, see also Allayannis and Ofek (1996) .
8 Dolde (1993) reports similar findings for the U.S.
however, 91% of the sample firms never or only very rarely engage in such transactions.
Of course, firms might not be telling the truth. This is quite possible, but when we group firms into those that disclose their identity and those that choose to remain anonymous, the two resulting subsamples have the same proportion (10%) of speculators. If some firms were misrepresenting their speculation for fear of bad publicity, we would expect a lower proportion of speculators in the sample that disclose their identity.
Rather than speculation in the sense defined here, the survey uncovers apparent evidence of widespread currency risk protection activities. When asked if they protected in any way against unexpected foreign exchange rate changes during 1993, 1994, or 1995, the firms answer as shown in Table 8 . As one can see, more than 80% of the firms report protecting in one of the three years. Moreover, 90% protected at least once in those years, and 76% protected in all three years (not shown).
Industrials may fail to appreciate the importance of knowing their risk exposure
One could argue that industrials fail to compute their currency RP of firm value because they do not understand its importance. The hypothesis can be tested, since it implies that more sophisticated companies are more likely to know at least the currency risk profile of their operating cash flow. Presumably, sophistication is a function of the available resources. Thus we test whether larger firms are more likely than smaller firms to quantify the currency risk profile of their operating cash flow. We ask firms to quantify the impact on their cash flow of 10% changes in currency rates and partition their answers by firm size as approximated by annual sales. The results are presented in Table 9 in the form of a two-by-two contingency test. 9 Table 9 Ability to quantify the impact of unexpected changes in at least one of four currencies (U.S. dollar, German mark, Italian lira, French franc) by firm size. Firm size is approximated by the value of annual sales. As it turns out, the test is not significant with 0.95 confidence (the 2 χ -value is 1.75, compared with a critical value of 3.84), suggesting that knowledge of the currency RP and firm size are uncorrelated. In fact, the majority, 64%, of large and therefore presumably more sophisticated firms do not know the RP in question. For small firms, the split between those that know and those that don't is 50/50. The same conclusion follows when we examine qualitative knowledge about the currency risk exposure of the operating cash flow. We repeat the test by proxying for the degree of sophistication by whether firms are listed. The results are the same.
9 As pointed out in Section 2, we do not have sales data for 12 unlisted firms. That explains why the sample in the table is 84 firms instead of 96.
Consequently, firms that would seem to have the resources to appreciate the importance of assessing currency risk exposure are not more likely to possess that information than other firms. The implication would seem to be that companies do not deem it necessary to know their currency risk exposure. Of course, if they don't know the RP of operating cash flow, it is even more unlikely that they will know the RP of firm value.
Industrials' currency exposure may be minimal
The third hypothesis is that industrial firms' exposure to currency risk is so small that it would be a waste of time to assess it formally.
Supporting evidence would seem to come from studies that examine the sensitivity of stock prices to changes in currency rates. Such sensitivity is small not only in the U.S. [Jorion (1990) ], but also elsewhere [Bodnar and Gentry (1993) ], including in Switzerland [Jacobs (1995) ]. According to Jacobs (1995) , only an insignificant minority of the firms traded on the ZSE are measurably sensitive to changes in currency rates. Currency exposure is either small to begin with or is reduced by firms' hedging activities. Since, as reported above, the majority of firms do protect against currency risk, we tend to believe that, if currency exposure is indeed small, it becomes so as the result of the firms' protective efforts.
Support for this conclusion comes when we ask firms: "Without the use of currency derivatives, how strong would be the impact on your firm of unexpected foreign exchange rate changes?"
The answers are shown in Table 10 . 
Firms may believe that unexpected currency rate changes are offsetting
We have argued that managing risk can add value because of concavities in the risk profile of firm value. Consequently, if our firms believe that changes in foreign exchange rates are offsetting in the short run, risk management has little justification. Consistent with that, we find that 24 of 96 firms (25%) do not protect long-term cash flows because they believe that positive and negative currency rate changes cancel each other out. But if they believe that, why do they protect at all-or, at least, why do they set up long-term operating hedges, as we will see subsequently?
Furthermore, how can they tell that their exposure is symmetric if they cannot quantify it?
The currency RP of firm value may be the inappropriate risk profile to consider
The currency RP of firm value is not necessarily what firms have to know to manage their risk effectively. In fact, only 28% of the firms in the sample want to protect firm value directly. Moreover, when asked to indicate the single most important target, only 1% of the firms indicate firm value. That could be yet another reason why firms do not compute their RP. Depending on the source of benefits they hope to reap from currency risk management, it can be simpler to focus on the RP of other variables. Although many possible variables come to mind, we restrict ourselves to three: taxable income, liquidity/operating cash flow, and value of contractually set transactions.
Currency risk profile of taxable income
If the rationale for managing risk is to reduce taxes [Smith and Stulz (1985) ], it makes more sense to focus on the currency RP of taxable income than on that of firm value. With progressive marginal tax rates, it is by reducing the currency risk exposure of taxable income (really, the currency-induced volatility of that income) that firms can reduce their expected taxes. We can shed light on this hypothesis by investigating why firms engage in currency risk management. Moreover, at least for multinationals, taxes may not be assessed on the firm's consolidated income (as implicitly assumed here) but rather at the level of its foreign subsidiaries.
Currency risk profile of liquid assets/operating cash flow
Another purpose of risk management could be to ensure there is enough liquidity for the firm to seize valuable investment opportunities when they arise [Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) and (1994) One variation of this hypothesis is that the variable firms focus on to guarantee sufficient funds for future investments is operating cash flow (see also Stulz, 2000, chapter 4) . There is some merit to this hypothesis but, as we saw in Section 4.2 above, less than half of the firms know the associated RP. And even when we look at firms with a reason to protect against currency risk, only half know the RP of their cash flow. Moreover, that risk profile is more of a ballpark figure than anything else, since it corresponds to an average hedging horizon of 8 months and excludes considerations of indirect exposure. In sum, this variation of the hypothesis also fails to explain credibly why firms do not know the RP of firm value.
Currency risk profile of foreign-currency-denominated contracts
Finally, firms may not compute the currency risk exposure of their value because they focus on transaction exposure instead. To explore this potential attention to transaction exposure as opposed to economic exposure, we ask firms what variables they shield from unexpected currency rate changes. The answers are reported in Table 12 .
Almost two-thirds of the answering companies protect individual foreign exchange commitments and claims. In comparison, there is much more reluctance to shield future cash in-and outflows that have not been
contractually stipulated yet. Interestingly, only 26% of these firms focus, and therefore presumably compute, a net figure of aggregate transaction exposure (aggregate foreign exchange commitments minus claims). use them always or often, and another 27% use them at times. 11 The particular types of currency derivatives used are listed in Table 13 . (1988) ]. This argument ignores disclosure considerations, however. Firms might prefer forward contracts to options because the former do not show up on the balance sheet [see also Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) , 16].
Industrials may be unable to measure their currency RP of firm value with the necessary accuracy
Concern about measurement error could be a further reason industrial firms do not measure their currency RP of firm value. As mentioned above, establishing a firm's currency RP of firm value requires the following steps: (1) projecting the firm's free cash flows; (2) capitalizing those cash flows to compute firm value; and (3) assessing how unexpected changes in currency rates affect that value. There are several problems in implementing this estimation. First, it is difficult to project the relevant future cash flows. Second, the assets of these firms trade, if at all, in highly illiquid markets. That complicates the assessment of the appropriate cost-of-capital measures. Third, currency exposure changes with the identity and the policies of competitors, suppliers, and customers.
Basing risk management on inaccurate measures of risk exposure can lead to seriously flawed hedges that could potentially increase rather than decrease currency risk.
To investigate this hypothesis, we examine the answers to the Table 14 lists the possibilities we investigate and the frequency with which they are mentioned.
Almost half of the firms profess an inability to measure future cash flows and their currency composition with much precision. This is consistent with the claim that sample companies are afraid of making mistakes in assessing their currency risk exposure. There is also evidence that firms focus on short-term transaction exposure, since 34% of the firms hedge individual transactions. Note that 29% of the firm focus on the short term with the argument that any long-term exposure will be reduced with on-balance-sheet instruments. 
5.7
The derivatives hedge may be too large
Reducing the economic exposure of the firm could require derivatives hedges of substantial proportions. Although this would not be a problem when currencies move against the firm and the derivative securities yield money to cover the losses, there might be a problem when currencies move in the firm's favor. In that case, the operational leg of the hedge is more valuable, but the firm has to come up with the liquidity necessary to cover losses on the derivatives leg. The firm might lack the internal liquidity to do so, and it might be unable to liquidate assets without impairing its operations. Take the case of ABB, a producer of, among other things, turbines for power generation. If it needed liquidity to cover derivatives losses, it couldn't sell the machinery used to produce the turbines without compromising its business. A sale-and-leaseback could be the solution, but ABB might be unable to find a counterparty quickly and at acceptable terms. The firm could in principle also raise outside funds but, because of various frictions in the capital market, that might not always be possible either. Plus, the losses on the derivatives leg might be mistaken for unhedged losses and cause inappropriate policy decisions [see the Metallgesellschaft case as described in Culp and Miller (1995) ].
The upshot of all this is that if firms are unwilling to establish the necessary derivatives hedges, there may be no reason to compute a currency RP of firm value in the first place. According to Table 14 above, however, only 16% of the sample companies are reluctant to hedge future cash flows for fear of having to establish a derivatives hedge of substantial proportions.
On-balance-sheet hedging
None of the hypotheses about why firms do not know the RP of firm value (or that of cash flow) has much explanatory power, except to some extent the notion that firms choose to concentrate instead on transaction exposure. The problem is that there is evidence that firms are also concerned about economic exposure. This section presents that evidence and uses it to conjecture an additional hypothesis about why firms do not know the RP of firm value (or of cash flow).
On-balance-sheet risk management instruments
On-balance-sheet risk management instruments include contractual clauses, money-market hedges, and operating adjustments [see, especially, Shapiro (1996) ]. They can be used as alternatives to or in addition to currency derivatives to protect against foreign exchange risk. 12 Their name distinguishes them from derivative securities, which are typically reported off the balance sheet. Table 15 documents the importance of contractual clauses and money-market hedges as tools to manage currency risk. Money-market hedges are defined in the questionnaire as financing foreign activities in foreign currencies, or lending or investing in foreign currencies to offset liabilities denominated in foreign currencies. 13 The table shows that money-market hedges are fairly diffuse, as almost 60% of the firms claim to be using them. Firms also attempt to shed currency risk with contractual clauses that give them the right to choose the currency in which to pay or be paid. Currency risk sharing and various forms of government-sponsored currency risk insurance are also used, but much less frequently. 12 A rigorous treatment of operational hedging can be found in Chowdhry and Howe (1997) . 13 For the use of foreign debt as a hedging device, see also Allayannis and Ofek (1996) .
In addition to using these tools, firms can make several operating adjustments to limit the likelihood or the severity of losses arising from currency risk. adjustments are used more often than ex-post adjustments. Table 16 On-balance-sheet tools of currency risk management: Operating adjustments in reaction to currency risk. Sample year: 1996.
Percentage of firms making these adjustments
Pricing policy 65% Choice of countries in which to buy inputs 48% Credit policy 41% Improving productivity 31% Choice of countries in which to sell products and services 31% Improving the flexibility of manufacturing systems 20% Relocating parts of the firm abroad 18% Shifting production among plants internationally 14% Changing the pace of product/service innovation 10% Setting the size of the budget for sales promotion 0%
Firms do not think they need to know their RP
The preceding section has documented that firms use on-balancesheet instruments to reduce what is essentially economic exposure.
Therein could lie the reason they do not know their RP of firm value (or at least that of their cash flow). Industrials may think that they do not need to know their RPs. Their hedging approach can be described as follows.
Firms may follow a two-phased approach to reduce economic exposure with on-balance-sheet tools. First, they may try to reduce currency risk when making strategic decisions using the tools mentioned 
6.3
Can it be optimal to ignore exposure?
The crucial question is whether it makes sense for firms to ignore the RP of their operating cash flow, let alone that of their value. In some cases, it is apparent that firms can use on-balance-sheet tools to reduce (not eliminate) their economic exposure without quantifying it. Take the case of the natural shield Nestlé has obtained by setting up plants around the world. This has allowed the firm to diversify away at least some of its currency risk without actually knowing its risk exposure. The situation is akin to that of investors exposed to stock return volatility. Part of that volatility can be shed by diversification, something that does not 14 The findings in Brown (1999) are consistent with this argument. See, in particular, p. 27. 15 The microhedging practice was confirmed in a discussion with the CFO of one of the largest Swiss multinationals. Accordingly, depending on his department's views about a particular currency, the CFO hedges the remittence of dividends from subsidiaries. In contrast, royalty flows are not hedged because they are much more frequent than dividends. By the law of large numbers, the argument went, currency rate changes even out.
necessarily require knowledge of actual portfolio return volatilities.
Another operating decision that can reduce risk without requiring an explicit estimation of exposure is the matching of foreign-currency denominated sales with foreign-currency denominated costs. This matching can be achieved, for example, by locating production plants or sourcing production factors in the countries where firms sell. Moneymarket hedges, such as the funding of foreign investments with foreign currencies, can also reduce exposure without requiring knowledge of that exposure.
The problem is that a rough estimate of exposure should not be prohibitively expensive to obtain and could be beneficial in better calibrating the use of on-balance-sheet tools. For instance, if firms knew (even roughly) their RP of firm value, they could better determine the amount of foreign currency funding needed to offset the currency risk of foreign operations. Moreover, knowledge of the RP of cash flow could enable firms to use currency derivatives more effectively. If nothing else, focusing on that RP would force them to move away from their microhedging approach to transaction exposure.
Are Swiss firms a special case?
In assessing the relevance of our findings, one important question is whether they can be generalized. Are Swiss firms a special case? One possible answer comes from reiterating that the sample includes some fairly large multinational corporations, such as Ciba-Geigy AG and Sandoz (now merged into Novartis), Swissair, Oerlikon Bührle, and Sulzer. More importantly, we can compare some of our findings with findings reported elsewhere. Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) , in particular, have surveyed derivative usage in German and U.S. firms. We can use that study for a comparison.
The more striking similarities between the two studies are:
Ø Like Swiss firms, U.S. and German firms use both currency derivatives and on-balance-sheet instruments to reduce currency risk. This has been observed also, among others, by Petersen and Thiagarajan (1998) and Brown (1999) ;
Ø In their risk management strategies, U.S. and German firms appear to pursue the same targets as Swiss firms. All firms, regardless of nationality, primarily target accounting earnings and cash flow rather than firm value. In comparison, 83% of our firms target operating cash flows, and 80% target earnings.
Ø As in our sample firms, U.S. and German firms hedge/insure transaction exposure, while essentially ignoring translation exposure.
Ø The horizon of U.S. and German firms in hedging/insuring transaction exposure is also not much longer than 12 months. 16 Ø OTC forwards are the most frequently used currency derivative in U.S. and German firms. OTC swaps come second (at least for German firms), and OTC options are third. According to Table  13 above, Swiss firms have the same preferences.
So, in general, it would appear that our firms are similar to firms in Germany and in the U.S. One apparent difference is that larger firms in the Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) study are more likely than small firms to focus on cash flow and firm value. Swiss firms do not share that regularity. Yet, since Swiss companies are more likely when compared with the firms in the Bodnar and Gebhardt study to focus on cash flow and firm value to begin with, it is not clear whether this apparent difference is significant.
16 It would appear that U.S. and German firms hedge anticipated cash flows that are not contractually committed more often than our firms. We would need more information, however, to make a definite statement.
Accuracy
The problem with a survey is that the person who fills it out does not necessarily have the relevant information or the motivation to provide careful and truthful answers. Moreover, questions are not always interpreted correctly. We try to gauge accuracy in different ways.
First, we wanted to make sure that the people who completed the questionnaire had the information we were interested in. This is why, as mentioned in Section 2, the questionnaire was sent to the chief financial officer and, if there was no such function, to the controller or the treasurer of the firm. Then we asked firms to tell us who actually filled out the questionnaire. Fourth, the questionnaire contains questions about sales, equity ratios, current ratios, and dividends, which we can verify with published data. This enables us to identify all traded firms in the sample. A large divergence between published and reported data flags firms that did not take the time to provide accurate answers. As it turns out, the correlation between published and reported data is generally fairly high. If we take sales, for instance, the correlation is essentially 1. The same holds for dividends on registered and voting bearer shares. For equity ratios, the correlation indicates fairly high accuracy as well, although it is comparatively low, 0.91. The reason could be that there are different ways to compute this ratio. We tried to avoid this problem by providing the necessary definition of equity ratio in a footnote. Still, responding firms could have misunderstood the definition of book value of equity. Seventh, we asked the respondents to indicate the questions that were difficult to understand. The only question that appears to have created some confusion was the quantification of the exposure of operating cash flow. But, as mentioned above, that applies to only 12% of the firms.
Finally, this survey is the second of its kind. Whereas it is different from the preceding one [Scognamiglio (1995) ], some answers can be compared. In particular, both surveys find that firms do not know the currency risk profile of their operating cash flow.
Conclusions
The purpose of this survey was to examine the risk management policies of industrial firms. The expectation was that they estimate the risk profile of firm value (or at least that of their operating cash flow) and hedge/insure it with derivative securities. That is not what we find.
Firms appear to rely on operating tools both actively and reactively to protect against currency risk. Currency derivatives are used mainly to microhedge/microinsure transaction exposure. These results raise many questions for future research. One of the most challenging is the apparent overall approach to risk management by firms, namely the reduction of economic exposure with (mostly) onbalance-sheet instruments on the one hand and the short-run microhedging and microinsuring of transaction exposure with (mostly) currency derivatives on the other. What makes this approach particularly puzzling is that it does not seem to rely on even rough quantitative assessments of exposure (of firm, cash flow, or transaction value). We suspect that these observations could be the result of the way firms are internally organized and of the incentives they create for their executives.
CFOs and treasurers may have a compartmentalized view of the firm.
Their main incentive might be to guarantee sufficient liquidity and borrowing capacity rather than to worry about firm value directly. 
